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WILL CURRENT POLICIES AND CAPABILITIES ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO CONTROL SPACE?
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
-President John F. Kennedy 1 The United States and the world as we knew it changed dramatically on September 11, 
BACKGROUND
WHAT IS SPACE?
Space is often thought of as an empty vacuum extending throughout the universe. In reality it is a place filled with energy particles, radiation, and an infinite number of objects large and small. It is an environment of extremes where distances are enormous and speed ranges from zero to the speed of light. It is an environment that is ever changing and one that is hostile for satellites.
There is no universally accepted definition of where space actually begins but space is where the atmosphere ends. It is generally accepted that this is where objects will remain in orbit, even for a brief period of time. This happens at altitudes above 81 miles from the earth's surface. 2 
WHY IS SPACE IMPORTANT TO US?
The United States is more reliant on space capabilities than any other country in the world. 3 Our commercial, civil, and military sectors use space or space-based assets for their day-to-day activities such as television, automatic teller banking, and various intelligence activities. One of the key operational considerations for space as defined in Joint Publication 3-14 is that space has no geographic boundaries. The physical borders of sovereign nations do not extend into space according to international treaties and conventions. Unrestricted overflights in space permit access to other nations including remote and restricted areas. 4 If we are unable to control space we open ourselves to attack. Congress chartered "The Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security, Space Management and Organization," (better known as the Space Commission Report). This report found that:
The security and economic well-being of the United States and its allies and friends depend on the nation's ability to operate successfully in space. To be able to contribute to peace and stability in a distinctly different but still dangerous and complex global environment, the U.S. needs to remain at the forefront in space, technology and operationally, as we have in the air, on land and at sea. Specifically, the U.S. must have the capability to use space as an integral part of its ability to manage crises, deter conflicts and if deterrence fails , to prevail in conflict. Union in addition to other potential threats around the world. This is true even today as we have seen the bi-polar world of the Cold War transition into a multi-polar world where we continue to command the global commons of space, sea, and air which is a vital facet of our global power.
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Commercial
Commercially, space allows us the use of satellite television and cell phones. It is the means to receive on-the-scene instant news reports from reporters on the ground in the world's hotspots. The malfunction of Galaxy IV in May 1998 silenced 90% of the pagers in the United
States along with television and data links to millions of people. 7 The loss of Intelsat IS-804
15 January 2005 left many remote South Pacific areas completely cut off from outside communications and several other countries switched to backup systems for their voice and data needs. 8 While rare, such events illustrate the extensive reliance of space systems in everyday life and the challenges to restore service to those customers when lost. Without space the search for natural resources like oil, minerals, and natural gas would return to the days of drilling hundreds of dry holes to find a producing well or mine. Most importantly, the loss of the Global Positioning System (GPS) would have serious impacts not only for hikers and boaters, but the airlines, cargo delivery companies, railroads and commuter lines that depend on the precision timing and location capabilities the system offers.
Civil
In the civil government arena, space-enabled services that are taken for granted include services such as: Emergency communications over radio and cellular phones for fire, police and other first-responders. Long-range weather forecasting is directly tied to meteorological satellites. GPS is the basis for many search and rescue organizations, the tracking of emergency vehicles, school busses, public transportation, and airliners to name a few.
Malfunctions and losses of satellites such as the Galaxy and Intelsat systems pose significant challenges for civil governments' health and safety of its populace. In today's modern world vast numbers of services are tied to space based systems.
Military
The would be nearly impossible with any form of precision currently conducted by our forces.
WHAT IS SPACE CONTROL?
Space control is the actions which provide friendly forces freedom of action in space while denying freedom of action to an adversary. The four mission areas included under space control are space surveillance, protection, prevention, and negation. Surveillance includes the ability to detect and track objects. The protection mission focuses on passive measures to enhance the survivability of space assets. Prevention is prohibiting adversaries from "exploiting U.S. or allied space services" through measures such as encryption or shutter control (shutting down access to imagery). 10 The negation mission includes the measures to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade or even destroy an adversary's capability to use space from the ground, the linkage or the space segment itself.
WHY IS SPACE CONTROL IMPORTANT?
For decades the President and his key decision makers have relied on our space systems to provide them with critical worldwide (C4ISR) capabilities and support. Controlling space ensures the United States the ability to receive vital information and act decisively with it.
Defending the Information Operations (computer and communications) networks is a key Department of Defense mission assigned to U.S. Strategic Command as we are "the nation most heavily reliant on technology for its economy, defense and way of life." 12 The importance of space and our computer capabilities is reflected by three key facts from the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) fact file:
• Near real-time satellite imagery and weather, combined with instant satellite communications and the accuracy and timing provided by GPS, gives U.S. and allied commanders' unparalleled awareness of operations occurring within their designated areas of responsibility.
• Space support to current operations is a perfect example of how the United States fights. Satellite-aided munitions, communications, navigation, and weather systems, combine to achieve military objectives in a relatively short amount of time.
• Global communications are growing. The use of cellular phones and pagers, ATMs, and satellite-delivered TV are a way of life for most Americans.
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HOW COULD THE UNITED STATES CONTROL SPACE?
There are two options for the United States to effectively control space. The first is by military means using any or all of the space control mission areas (surveillance of space, protection, prevention, and negation) found in Joint Publication 3-14. This could involve any or all of the service components within U.S. Strategic Command or other combatant commands.
The second method to control space would be through diplomatic means. While a military option is fairly easy to conduct it is the later of the two options that has the greatest difficulties associated with it for the United States.
MILITARY
There are three ways in which the military could control space. The first is at the satellite itself. This could be accomplished with kinetic munitions, microwave energy, or high-powered lasers resulting in permanent or temporary damage. The second area is with the satellites data link. The links are separated by frequency into down-link and up-link data streams whose function is dependent upon the nature of the payload. For example, the data streams could carry such information as a television broadcast, telephone calls, and the command and control information for the satellite. 14 The links could be jammed, intercepted or have false data inserted into them. Finally there is the ground segment which is susceptible to physical attack.
Operations affecting the ground segment would be conducted by the regional combatant command while the effects needed for space assets are the responsibility of U.S Strategic
Command. As the combatant command for space, U.S. Strategic Command is the command and control center responsible for U.S. strategic forces and controls the military space operations (including the forces needed to conduct the missions) should action be required to protect our space systems. 15 The operational components of U.S. Strategic Command represent the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Of the three it is the Air Force with the greatest number of space operators and organizations. A distant second is the Army and the Navy. Any military operation would dictate coordination and cooperation among the services.
Understandably the specifics of space control are highly classified due to National Security but the basics are readily available. We plan to deliver two more of the first generation units in FY05 to achieve a Full Operational capability, and will then begin work on the next generation capability. We also intend to award a contract for the multi-service Army/Air Force Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System (CSRS) for final system design and development. CSRS is a mobile, transportable system that will use reversible effects to counter space-based surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. Our goal is to achieve Initial Operational Capability in FY09. 16 The Army's capability for space control is similar to that described above for the Air Force Organization to the media. 18 It is the ability to readily obtain imagery of previously denied areas that concerns U.S. military and governmental leaders. The act created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to seek and encourage the fullest commercial use of space. 21 The exception to this applied to the "activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapon systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense." China may have the capability to deploy anti-satellite weapons but it is the U.S. and the former USSR who had known programs. There are two categories of anti-satellite weapons, interceptors and directed-energy weapons. The former would make physical contact with a satellite while the later would be an Earth-based system. A serious drawback in using an antisatellite weapon would be from the debris damaging other government and commercial satellites.
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In addition to the military systems discussed above for the control of space, another potential method of attack would be by a High Altitude Nuclear Device. Very few countries have the capability to launch such a weapon that would have long-term severe consequences if used.
The radiation exposure would damage those satellites in the line of sight and drastically reduce the usability of the other satellites passing into the radiation.
Guidelines for the policy of space control would need to fully address the circumstances leading to the United States disrupting, denying, degrading, deceiving or even destroying an adversary's space capability. As the National Military Strategy mentions, these options would be for the President and Secretary of Defense to approve for action after all diplomatic means have been exhausted.
GIVEN THE ABOVE WILL THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED MILITARY CAPABILITIES ENABLE US TO CONTROL SPACE?
The military capabilities of the United States will allow us to control space now and in the future. Air Force Undersecretary Teet's vision of space control was detailed by researchers and analysts in 2002 at the RAND Corporation whose report: Space Weapons -Earth Wars , discusses the fact and fiction of space weapons. 32 In a review of the RAND report for space.com several distinct classes of space weapons were reviewed. While the weapons listed below reflect a missile threat to the United States, their potential to affect orbiting or terrestrial space capabilities can not be overlooked as a means to control space:
• Directed-energy weapons, such as space lasers. They use millions of watts of power and large optics to deliver a speed-of-light knockout punch as a missile arcs over Earth. Depending on the wavelength of the energy beamed out and atmospheric conditions, an energy beam can destroy a target on Earth's surface;
• Kinetic-energy weapons against missile targets. This hardware can ram headlong into a target in space or an object still within the upper reaches of Earth's atmosphere;
• Space-based kinetic energy weapons that slam into targets on the ground, such as large ships, tall buildings, and fuel tanks. Sleek and meteoroid-like in speed, these weapons attack targets at steep, nearly vertical trajectories; and
• Space-based conventional weapons capable of maneuvering to hit terrestrial targets. These can carry and dispense rather exotic packages of destruction, such as radio-frequency or high-power microwave munitions. • Counter Satellite Communications System to deny and disrupt an adversary's communications and early warning systems by 2010.
• Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System for the near-term to deny, disrupt and degrade adversary space-based surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
• Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engagement (EAGLE) Airship Relay Mirrors which are intended to significantly extend the range of both the Airborne Laser and Ground-Based laser by using airborne, terrestrial or space-based lasers in conjunction with space-based relay mirrors to project different laser powers and frequencies to achieve a broad range of effects from illustration to destruction.
• Ground-Based Laser propagates laser beams through the atmosphere to Low-Earth Orbit satellites to provide robust, post-2015 defensive and offensive space control capability.
• Hypervelocity Rod Bundles provide the capability to strike ground targets anywhere in the world from space.
• Orbital Deep Space Imager is a mid-term predictive, near-real time common operating picture of space to enable space control operations.
• Orbital Transfer Vehicle significantly adds flexibility and protection of US space hardware in the post-2015 era while enabling on-orbit servicing of those assets.
• Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System is a family of systems that will provide near-term capability to automatically identify when a space system is under attack.
• Space-Based Radio Frequency Energy Weapon is a far-term constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency transmitters that possess the capability to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety of electronics and nationallevel command and control systems. It would typically be used as a nonkinetic anti-satellite weapon.
• Space-Based Space Surveillance System is a near-term constellation of optical sensing satellites to track and identify space forces in deep space to enable offensive and defensive counterspace operations. 35 The RAND report's list of weapons is in concert with Undersecretary Teets statement above regarding systems to deny space use to adversaries. A grave concern not addressed is the potential for space debris from a kinetic incident. The danger here is the creation of hundreds or even thousands of items in space that in turn could harm or destroy satellites, vessels, or personnel upon impact.
The Transformation Flight Plan lists impressive capabilities for the next two decades that should allow the United States to control space through military means. Space capable countries such as Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Japan, Israel and Brazil are pursuing new types of technology for space applications which could be used for spacebased weapons. 36 It would appear that the Plan would seek to maintain an edge over other countries in the same manner that the U.S. is ahead of these countries now in our ability to protect our space systems. Our ability to defend and even withstand a threat to our space systems does include active and passive measures such as maneuver and hardening in addition to offensive capabilities described above.
GIVEN THE ABOVE WILL THE CURRENT NATIONAL POLICIES ENABLE US TO CONTROL SPACE?
The current policies of the United States enable us to control space as the dominant superpower but in a post Cold War and post "September 11 th " age updated and clarified policies to clearly reflect our capabilities and intent are missing. Having a space policy for the nation should be that of the current administration, not one from two Presidential elections ago and address four key issues. First, an integrated space control architecture involving the systems and capabilities of the United States. Second, the active and passive methods of Defensive
Counterspace should be stressed. Third, permanent and temporary effects of Offensive
Counterspace should clearly be articulated to preclude a potential adversary from attacking our space capabilities. Finally, the policy should clearly convey the diplomatic consequences should our systems be attacked regardless of the aggressors status.
The space policy should also address the way we look at and describe space control.
Currently the Department of Defense addresses Space Control when it should use the term Space Supremacy in the same context as air and maritime supremacy if we intend the opposing force (regardless of who it may be) to be incapable of effective interference. This would align terminology across the Department and accurately reflect our intent.
The policies we have today could be used against third parties. While they may become the source of problems in the future, the technology to defeat them is the same as that for our adversaries. The problem lies in what we are facing today in the Global War on Terror. Third party use of technology stopped when it was made known that there was a means to track them. While this is an example of a determined adversary who adjusted to our actions, the safety and survivability of space systems is not an absolute. Dedicated Defensive Counterspace, as recommended above, should protect our systems.
The diplomatic leverage of the United States is often overlooked in discussions involving space control. In many respects this has been the most successful method to achieve superiority. The most recent success with diplomacy has been "shutter control" as discussed above. While that is always an option, the means of controlling space are much the same as with any other international issue the United States is involved in. Offers for third party discussions and economic incentives on one end to sanctions at the other end are at the disposal of the government to achieve its space control goals short of the military option.
Diplomacy, however, cannot guarantee that actions against our space systems will not be taken. The diplomatic approach may not be unilateral in that our allies could be leveraged against the potential adversary to resolve the matter in our favor. Diplomatic opposition by our adversaries could also serve as a rallying cry for those opposed to American ideas and polices.
The most realistic way to look at what might happen is for the United States to state that it will take action unless an adversary is proven to be without involvement in matters affecting our space assets. The most likely exercise of American will to protect homeland would be the use of our military capabilities against an attack. When the art and skill of diplomacy fail, the protection of the homeland may involve military actions with adverse second or third order consequences.
The political will would require the defeat of an adversary as early and as far removed from the United States as well as our allies and friends.
CONCLUSION
The United States remains the world's only superpower and the leader in space
capabilities. Yet within the space club there are fewer than a dozen nations which have the capability to independently launch their own or another's satellite into space from less than two dozen sites worldwide. Besides the U.S., Russia and now the People's Republic of China can independently place mankind in orbit without depending on another country for support.
Technology is permitting the rest of the world to catch up to America's current capabilities.
To remain the premier power we must take any and all steps to ensure we have access to and from space-based assets in times of peace and war. How we ensure that access depends on the political and military situations but the one publicly stated constant is that we will exercise our capabilities to control space by surveillance of activities for situational awareness, protection of friendly assets, preventing the hostile use of others space systems, or negating an adversary's use of space systems. This could be done by using any one or a combination of the above missions which is in concert with President Bush's National Security Strategy to "deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails." 37 WORD COUNT=5413
